Chrome plugin, browser and computer use refuse to interact with certain sites.

Open 💬 8 comments Opened Jun 21, 2026 by joshp123
💡 Likely answer: A maintainer (github-actions[bot], contributor) responded on this thread — see the highlighted reply below.

What version of the Codex App are you using (From “About Codex” dialog)?

Version 26.616.51431

What subscription do you have?

pro €225/month

What platform is your computer?

_No response_

What issue are you seeing?

Codex silently refuses to load certain sites using the Chrome plugin.

there seems to be a server-side blacklist of sites that Codex refuses to load. When you try and access one of these sites, the browser plugin throws an error:

Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy.
Reason: Browser Use is not permitted on https://detail.1688.com.

these sites aren't malicious or don't seem to be against TOS or anything: normal e-commerce sites such as Taobao or 1688.com.
futhermore, this isn't documented anywhere either.

Philosophically, having a web browser that decides - server side - which websites it can and can't load, without any transparency on this, it's not great. I could (grudgingly) understand if the sites are malicious/pornographic/illegal/etc, but these are genuine huge e-commerce sites - the Western equivalent of blocking Amazon or Walmart. More broadly, silently blocking sites in a non-transparent/undocumented way doesn't feel right either.

It seems like you ALSO can't even use Computer Use on Chrome if a tab is open from one of the "non-permitted" websites:

mcp__computer_use.get_app_state({
  "app": "Google Chrome"
})
// returns:
[{"type":"text","text":"This session has been stopped because Computer Use is not allowed on the current browser URL. Stop your work and send a final message noting why the session has been ended. Note that Computer Use is not allowed on this URL even if the user navigates to it themselves."}]

Obviously I could monkey-patch around this by modifying the javascript plugin or computer use.... but that's not an okay workaround either. Computer use, Chrome, and the Browser plugin should just work on all (legal) sites.

What steps can reproduce the bug?

Feedback ID: 019ee97a-589a-7670-9b4c-a7eadac555ba

What is the expected behavior?

The built in plugins do not run a server-side check to see if users are permitted to look at a certain site or not.

Additional information

Codex investigated the issue further, a brief summary (before we get the clanker to attach a big slop comment of everything it found):

  • On every request, the Chrome plugin will make a request to https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/aura/site_status, if this endpoint returns something, the request will be blocked
  • chrome plugin code: /Users/<me>/.codex/plugins/cache/openai-bundled/chrome/26.616.51431/scripts/browser-client.mjs:3234

View original on GitHub ↗

8 Comments

github-actions[bot] contributor · 29 days ago

Potential duplicates detected. Please review them and close your issue if it is a duplicate.

  • #28764
  • #28478

Powered by Codex Action

joshp123 · 29 days ago

here's a bunch of slop from the clanker explaining the issue in more detail, included a list of blocked and not blocked sites. (i told it to check a bunch of chinese and western e-commerce sites, and a bunch of semi-dodgy sites to see what it found. you get the idea).

<details>
<summary>Additional Browser Use site-policy matrix from local Chrome-plugin testing</summary>


Additional evidence from local Codex Chrome Browser Use testing.

Environment:
- Date: 2026-06-21
- Codex app / plugin runtime: 26.616.51431
- Browser surface: Chrome extension Browser Use
- Local browser client path observed: /Users/<me>/.codex/plugins/cache/openai-bundled/chrome/26.616.51431/scripts/browser-client.mjs
- Relevant minified code pointer observed locally: browser-client.mjs:3234

Local code-path observation:
- Browser Use builds a request to https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/aura/site_status.
- It sends site_url, url_request_source=codex_browser_use, and available turn/session metadata.
- The local bundle does not appear to contain a simple hardcoded list of these domains.
- If the backend says the site is blocked, throwIfBlocksUrl(...) throws:
  "Browser Use is not permitted on <display URL>"
- Metadata commands such as tab listing/claiming/title/url can still work, which explains why an already-open blocked tab can expose title/url while DOM/screenshot/evaluate/navigation fail.
- Raw CDP is separately gated, and the thrown message explicitly says not to work around the block using raw CDP or alternate browser surfaces.

Test method:
- Used temporary Chrome Browser Use tabs and closed/finalized them after testing.
- Broad sweep: tab.goto(url), tab.url(), tab.title(), and where not policy-blocked, a read-only page-context check via tab.playwright.evaluate(() => location.href).
- Semi-dodgy sweep intentionally avoided page text/title extraction and used navigation, current URL, and location.href only.
- "Allowed" below means Browser Use policy did not block the page. It does not mean the site itself was usable; some allowed pages still showed Cloudflare, geo blocks, access-denied pages, login walls, or site-side antibot friction.
- Sensitive / dodgy domains below are intentionally broken with <deletethis> so they do not render as links.

Confirmed Browser Use policy blocks:

Normal ecommerce / sourcing / China-adjacent:
- 1688.com: www, login, m, s, and detail offer pages blocked.
- taobao.com: www, world, login, and item pages blocked.
- aliexpress.com: www and login blocked.
- pinduoduo.com blocked.
- you.163.com blocked.
- dhgate.com blocked.
- pan.baidu.com blocked.
- weixin.qq.com blocked.
- pay.weixin.qq.com blocked.
- mega.nz blocked.
- tokopedia.com blocked.

Semi-dodgy western / sensitive categories:
- Adult video / subscription:
  - pornhub<deletethis>.com
  - xvideos<deletethis>.com
  - xnxx<deletethis>.com
  - xhamster<deletethis>.com
  - onlyfans<deletethis>.com
- Torrent / index:
  - thepiratebay<deletethis>.org
  - 1337x<deletethis>.to
  - yts<deletethis>.mx
  - nyaa<deletethis>.si
  - torrentgalaxy<deletethis>.to
  - rutracker<deletethis>.org
- Repack / crack:
  - fitgirl-repacks<deletethis>.site
  - dodi-repacks<deletethis>.site
  - steamunlocked<deletethis>.net
  - igg-games<deletethis>.com
- ROM / emulation-adjacent:
  - vimm<deletethis>.net
  - cdromance<deletethis>.org
- Streaming piracy-ish:
  - fmovies<deletethis>.to
- Shadow libraries / papers:
  - libgen<deletethis>.is
  - sci-hub<deletethis>.se
- File lockers:
  - rapidgator<deletethis>.net
  - 4shared<deletethis>.com
- Cracking / leak forums:
  - cracked<deletethis>.io
  - hackforums<deletethis>.net

Important Browser Use policy ALLOWED comparators:

China search / portal / social:
- baidu.com, www.baidu.com, m.baidu.com, www.baidu.com search result URLs
- tieba.baidu.com
- map.baidu.com
- sogou.com
- so.com
- sm.cn
- qq.com
- im.qq.com
- weibo.com
- douyin.com
- kuaishou.com
- bilibili.com
- zhihu.com
- douban.com

China ecommerce / sourcing / travel / local services:
- alibaba.com
- login.alibaba.com
- tmall.com
- detail.tmall.com (Browser Use allowed; site redirected to a Tmall error page)
- jd.com (redirected to global.jd.com)
- global.jd.com
- jd.hk
- mobile.yangkeduo.com
- suning.com
- vip.com
- dangdang.com
- gome.com.cn
- goofish.com
- xiaohongshu.com
- dewu.com
- mogujie.com / mogu.com
- weidian.com
- youzan.com
- kwaixiaodian.com
- meituan.com
- dianping.com
- ele.me
- ctrip.com
- qunar.com
- made-in-china.com
- globalsources.com
- banggood.com
- geekbuying.com
- lightinthebox.com
- chinavasion.com
- temu.com
- shein.com
- yesstyle.com
- shopcider.com

China payment / cloud:
- alipay.com
- auth.alipay.com
- global.alipay.com
- unionpayintl.com
- alibabacloud.com
- tencentcloud.com
- cloud.baidu.com
- volcengine.com

Western ecommerce / marketplaces:
- Amazon NL/US/DE/UK
- eBay / eBay UK
- Etsy
- Walmart
- Target
- Best Buy
- Costco
- Home Depot (Browser Use allowed; site showed Access Denied)
- Lowe's
- Wayfair
- Newegg
- B&H
- Apple Store
- Google Store
- Microsoft Store (Browser Use allowed; Microsoft error page)
- Nike
- Adidas
- Zalando NL
- ASOS
- H&M
- IKEA NL
- Bol.com
- Coolblue
- MediaMarkt NL
- Marktplaats
- 2dehands
- Kleinanzeigen
- Vinted
- Facebook Marketplace
- Gumtree
- Craigslist
- Horeca.com
- XXLhoreca
- Metro
- Carrefour FR
- Auchan FR
- Fnac
- Cdiscount
- Decathlon NL
- Bauhaus
- Hornbach NL
- OBI DE
- PayPal
- Stripe Checkout
- Shopify
- Booking.com
- Airbnb
- Uber Eats
- Deliveroo
- Just Eat Takeaway
- DoorDash (Browser Use allowed; Cloudflare page)
- Instacart

Global ecommerce:
- shopee.sg
- lazada.sg
- rakuten.co.jp
- rakuten.com (Browser Use allowed; geogating page)
- jp.mercari.com
- mercari.com
- Yahoo Japan auctions/shopping (Browser Use allowed; EEA notice)
- allegro.pl
- ozon.ru (Browser Use allowed; antibot challenge page)
- wildberries.ru (Browser Use allowed; challenge/interstitial)
- mercadolibre.com
- olx.com

File / cloud storage:
- Google Drive
- Dropbox
- OneDrive
- iCloud
- Box
- WeTransfer
- MediaFire

Social / messaging:
- Facebook
- Instagram
- X / x.com
- Reddit
- TikTok
- YouTube
- Telegram Web
- WhatsApp Web
- Discord
- LinkedIn

Banking / finance / crypto:
- Chase
- Bank of America
- Wells Fargo
- Revolut
- Wise
- Coinbase
- Binance
- Kraken
- Robinhood
- eToro

Search / government / health / developer / gambling:
- Google, Bing, DuckDuckGo, Yahoo Search, Yandex, Naver, Daum
- IRS, GOV.UK, Belastingdienst, DigiD, MijnOverheid, SSA
- NHS, Mayo Clinic, WebMD, Zocdoc
- GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, npm, PyPI, Stack Overflow, Cloudflare, AWS, Azure, Vercel, Netlify
- Bet365, DraftKings Sportsbook, FanDuel, PokerStars, Stake, Polymarket, Kalshi

Semi-dodgy / sensitive allowed comparators:
- Adult/cam/community:
  - redtube<deletethis>.com
  - youporn<deletethis>.com
  - spankbang<deletethis>.com
  - tube8<deletethis>.com
  - fansly<deletethis>.com
  - manyvids<deletethis>.com
  - chaturbate<deletethis>.com
  - stripchat<deletethis>.com
  - fetlife<deletethis>.com
- Torrent / streaming / shadow-library-ish comparators:
  - eztvx<deletethis>.to
  - limetorrents<deletethis>.fun
  - 123moviesfree<deletethis> variant redirecting to ww8.123moviesfree<deletethis>.net
  - z-lib<deletethis>.gd
  - romhacking<deletethis>.net
- File lockers:
  - zippyshare<deletethis>.com
  - nitroflare<deletethis>.com
  - katfile<deletethis>.space
  - gofile<deletethis>.io
  - pixeldrain<deletethis>.com
  - sendspace<deletethis>.com
- Paste / leak-ish / cracking-ish comparators:
  - pastebin<deletethis>.com
  - rentry<deletethis>.co
  - controlc<deletethis>.com
  - leakbase<deletethis>.io
- Security dual-use:
  - exploit-db.com
  - shodan.io
  - urlscan.io
  - virustotal.com
  - haveibeenpwned.com
- Shortener / proxy / VPN / Tor:
  - bit.ly
  - tinyurl.com
  - t.co
  - hide.me
  - proxysite.com
  - torproject.org
  - nordvpn.com
  - mullvad.net
- Firearms / grey-market comparators:
  - gunbroker<deletethis>.com
  - armslist<deletethis>.com
  - cheaperthandirt<deletethis>.com
- Pharmacy-ish comparators:
  - hims.com
  - roman.com
  - goodrx.com
  - pharmacychecker.com

Inconclusive / site/network errors, not classified as Browser Use policy blocks in the tested run:
- login.baidu.com: DNS error
- xianyu.com: DNS error; goofish.com was allowed
- kaola.com: DNS error
- gearbest.com: DNS error
- fxg.jinritemai.com: navigation timeout in an earlier run
- bongacams<deletethis>.com: SSL protocol error
- putlocker<deletethis>.pe: DNS error
- soap2day<deletethis>.rs: local navigation timeout
- nulled<deletethis>.to: DNS error
- breachforums<deletethis>.st: DNS error

Pattern summary:
- Not a blanket Alibaba Group block: Alibaba, Alibaba login, Tmall, Alibaba Cloud, and Alipay were allowed, while 1688, Taobao, and AliExpress were blocked.
- Not a broad Chinese ecommerce block: JD, Tmall, Temu, Made-in-China, Global Sources, Weidian, Goofish, Suning, VIP, Dangdang, Ctrip, Qunar, and others were allowed.
- Not a broad China / Chinese-language block: Baidu search/maps/tieba, Sogou, 360 Search, Shenma, QQ, Weibo, Douyin, Kuaishou, Bilibili, Zhihu, and Douban were allowed.
- Not a broad file-storage block: Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive, iCloud, Box, WeTransfer, and MediaFire were allowed; Baidu Pan and Mega were blocked.
- Not a broad finance/payment block: banks, crypto exchanges, PayPal/Stripe, Alipay, UnionPay, and Alibaba/Tencent/Baidu cloud sites were allowed; WeChat Pay was blocked.
- Not a broad Western ecommerce block: the Western ecommerce sample had 0 Browser Use policy blocks.
- Not a broad regulated-category block: government/identity, health, banking, crypto, gambling, and prediction-market sites were allowed.
- Adult content appears selectively blocked, not categorically blocked.
- Copyright/piracy-adjacent sites are often blocked but not categorically blocked.
- Security dual-use, proxy/VPN/Tor, firearms, and pharmacy-ish categories were not broadly blocked in the tested sample.

Documentation status:
- Official docs I found document user-visible Browser/Chrome website approval and local allowed/blocked website settings.
- I did not find official docs for the server-side global site classifier, aura/site_status, the exact "Browser Use is not permitted on ..." policy, a published global blacklist/allowlist, or an appeal/reclassification process.

Why this seems actionable:
- The block is not obviously tied to the user's local allow/block settings.
- The block is not documented in the same place as user-visible site permissions.
- The classifier is selective in ways that are hard to infer from safety category alone.
- Legitimate commercial/research sites such as 1688/Taobao/AliExpress are blocked while many similar or more sensitive categories are allowed.

</details>

joshp123 · 29 days ago

<details>
<summary>AI-generated note on the bot-linked potential duplicates (#28764, #28478)</summary>

AI-generated.

GitHub's duplicate bot linked #28764 and #28478. I checked both. They are adjacent Browser Use security-policy reports, but they do not look like clean duplicates of this issue.

  • #28764 reports a Windows/Edge extension case where Codex can see and claim a manually opened Google Calendar tab, but page-content access is rejected as if the user explicitly denied https://calendar.google.com, despite visible Codex allow settings and Always allow browsing approval.

That is a local allow-state / explicit-deny mismatch for a specific Google Calendar origin. This issue is different: the Chrome/Browser runtime works across many sites, but selected public destinations are denied by the Browser Use policy layer. The behavior looks like server-side destination classification, not a stale local user-deny setting for one allowed origin.

  • #28478 is a sparse Chinese-language report saying the browser extension connection is normal, but page access is blocked by security policy. The screenshot clarifies the blocked site as my.feishu.cn and says it is blocked by a higher-level enterprise/network policy even when https://* is allowed.

That may be in the same general policy area, but it is not the same report. It is a single enterprise SaaS/workspace domain with enterprise/network-policy wording and little reproduction detail. This issue maps a broader selective blocklist/allowlist pattern across public ecommerce, sourcing, China web, file-storage, payment, and sensitive comparator sites.

Why this issue is distinct:

  • The plugin/runtime is present and usable.
  • The policy path appears reachable rather than failing globally.
  • Many external sites are allowed in the same session.
  • Specific destinations are denied with Browser Use policy errors.
  • The evidence is a destination-classification matrix, not just one blocked origin.

So #28764 and #28478 are useful related examples of Browser Use policy friction, but they should not close this issue as duplicates unless the intended maintainer conclusion is that all of these symptoms share one underlying undocumented policy classifier. If so, this issue still adds the blocked/unblocked comparator matrix needed to debug that classifier.

</details>

mikezio · 28 days ago

I checked the robots.txt files for a bunch of the blocked examples you posted + there is def a pretty clear pattern here

1688.com disallows generic crawlers from /offer/, /product/, /seller/, /member/, /catalog/ and a bunch of detail/query paths

item.taobao.com allows Googlebot and Googlebot-Image but has User-agent: * Disallow: /

login.taobao.com is also User-agent: * Disallow: /

AliExpress disallows generic crawlers from /items/, /search/, /productdetail/, /product/, /shopcart/, /wishlist/, /api/* + related AJAX/detail/store surfaces

Pinduoduo is just straight Disallow: /

Mega has User-agent: * Disallow: / with a specific allowlist only for public/static/help/marketing pages

Baidu Pan disallows share-link/share-home/list paths like /share/link/, /share/home/, /s/1*, /share/list

WeChat Pay disallows most /index.php/ paths except a small public/docs/static allowlist

So this does not look random to me, server side site status check Codex calls before browser interaction seems to be flagging sites/surfaces where the site itself is publishing restrictive crawler/automation rules especially product detail, search, login, cart/payment, file share + API surfaces

The main thing I still agree with in this issue is the opacity. Browser Use is not permitted on <url> makes it look arbitrary. Even a extremely rough reason category like “site automation policy” / “scraping sensitive surface” / “marketplace/product detail surface” would make this much easier to understand

joshp123 · 26 days ago

This also breaks appshots, btw. If you try and take an appshot on a Chrome window with a URL that's also blocked, you get an "unable to take appshot" message. Move the same Chrome window to a tab with a different non-blocked URL open, and appshots work just fine. This silent blocking really is not great UX :(

Feedback ID: no-active-thread-019ef9fa-4ca5-7ed2-a621-b50d2b6519ce

waffensam · 25 days ago

Adding one concrete use case from #30167 before closing it as a duplicate of this broader issue.

In my case, the blocked Taobao surfaces were encountered during an anti-cheat / abuse-reporting workflow, not normal shopping automation:

  • Goal: identify and report Taobao listings selling game cheats for Marathon / 失落星船.
  • Blocked surfaces observed: https://s.taobao.com/search and https://item.taobao.com/item.htm.
  • Intended allowed operations: read-only search result review, item-page inspection, evidence screenshots, and drafting report text.
  • Operations that should still remain gated or blocked: purchases, seller chat, account changes, payments, uploads, and final report submission without explicit user confirmation.

This seems useful as a safety-governance edge case for the same site-policy issue: the current block prevents defensive reporting work, even when the requested agent behavior is limited to read-only review and user-confirmed report drafting.

lom200 · 16 days ago

Adding another data point from Windows Codex Desktop.

Environment:

  • Codex Desktop: 26.623.13972.0
  • bundled Chrome plugin/native host: 26.623.101652
  • Chrome extension: 1.1.5
  • Chrome: 149.0.7827.201

Observed blocked origins:

https://dzen.ru/sekurtis
https://vk.ru/

Both fail with the same class of error:

Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy.
Reason: Browser use is not permitted on ...

Control sites that worked in the same session/profile:

  • https://www.google.com/ - claim/read/evaluate/screenshot/search interaction worked
  • https://www.facebook.com/ - navigation/read/evaluate/screenshot worked
  • http://e1.ru/ -> https://www.e1.ru/ - navigation/read/evaluate/screenshot worked
  • https://www.gismeteo.ru/ - navigation/read/evaluate/screenshot worked; clicking an internal Новости link also worked

Also checked that this is not a blanket .ru block: e1.ru and gismeteo.ru worked normally. Adding https://dzen.ru to local Browser Use origin allowlists did not change the rejection.

This looks like a domain/category-level Browser Use policy decision rather than a broken Chrome extension or general network/browser failure. The main user-facing issue is that the rejection does not expose whether the block is intentional policy, a remote site-status result, or a local config/state problem, so users can spend time trying to repair Chrome/config when there may be nothing local to fix.

chenlei-github · 5 days ago

Adding a current macOS data point for WeChat public pages.

Environment:

  • macOS 15.7.7 (24G720), x86_64
  • ChatGPT/Codex App 26.707.72221
  • Browser and Chrome plugins 26.707.72221

Blocked:

Allowed controls in the same Browser session:

Troubleshooting already completed:

  • mp.weixin.qq.com is present in ~/.codex/browser/config.toml under allowed origins; denied origins are empty.
  • Changed approval_mode from never_ask to ask, reset the Browser runtime, and retested: no change.
  • Removed and reinstalled the bundled Browser plugin with the official CLI: no change.
  • Fully quit and relaunched the ChatGPT/Codex App, initialized a fresh Browser session, and retested: no change.

Exact error:
Browser use is not permitted for this request. See the Browser Use policy documentation.

This confirms the issue is still reproducible in build 26.707.72221 and appears specific to the WeChat domain policy classification rather than local origin permissions, plugin installation, Browser session state, or general network access.