Add managed policy option to disable Windows sandbox ACL/DACL mutation
What variant of Codex are you using?
CLI, IDE Extension, and Codex App on Windows.
What feature would you like to see?
Please add a managed configuration option that lets administrators disable automatic Windows sandbox ACL/DACL changes on user-controlled paths.
Requested behavior:
- Codex may still perform first-time Windows sandbox provisioning:
- create/update
CodexSandboxOffline - create/update
CodexSandboxOnline - create/update
CodexSandboxUsers - set up Codex-owned helper/runtime/secrets directories needed for the sandbox
- Codex must not automatically add, remove, or rewrite allow/deny ACEs on:
- workspaces
- repositories
- user profile trees
AppData.git- additional writable/read roots
- arbitrary folders on other drives
- If the sandbox user does not already have the required NTFS rights, Codex should fail closed with a clear diagnostic:
- path
- required principal, e.g.
CodexSandboxOfflineorCodexSandboxUsers - required right, e.g. read/execute or modify
- suggested manual
icaclsdirection, without applying it automatically
Suggested config shape, exact naming flexible:
[windows]
sandbox = "elevated"
sandbox_acl_mode = "manual"
or in managed policy:
[windows]
sandbox_acl_mode = "manual"
Possible values:
automatic # current behavior/default
manual # never mutate workspace/user-path ACLs; fail if rights are missing
This should be enforceable from managed_config.toml so enterprise/admin-managed environments can require the safer mode globally.
Additional information
This is important for enterprise and security-controlled Windows environments.
Many IT/security teams do not want development tools silently changing NTFS DACLs because:
- ACLs are normally owned by endpoint management, GPO, Intune, security baselines, or deployment scripts.
- Silent inherited ACE changes can expand access across large profile/workspace trees.
- Unexpected deny ACEs can break Git, SSH, build tools, Electron/Chromium apps, and other software.
- Stale SIDs and modified ownership/permissions remain after uninstall or account cleanup.
- Auditors expect permission changes to be explicit, reviewable, and attributable.
- In regulated environments, failing closed is preferable to silently granting access.
For these environments, the desired model is:
- Codex provisions the sandbox identities.
- Administrators manually grant the required NTFS rights.
- Codex runs only where those rights already exist.
- Missing permissions produce a clear error instead of automatic ACL repair/mutation.
Related issues that appear to be in the same problem family:
- #14006 Windows sandbox may auto-apply NTFS deny ACE on world-writable workspace paths
- #12343 Security concern: CodexSandboxOffline/Online assigned to entire user profile tree on Windows 11
- #15777 Codex sandbox installation corrupts ACL on AppData
- #27236 Codex elevated Windows sandbox ACLs appear to break Electron/Chromium GPU sandbox for apps under AppData\Local
- #17179 Windows workspace-write sandbox can change project ownership to CodexSandboxOffline and cause persistent write failures
- #22044 Windows restricted-token sandbox issues around ACL/SID stamping
If maintainers consider this a duplicate of #14006, please treat this as a concrete proposed resolution: a managed, documented "manual ACL mode" for Windows sandboxing.
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