Add managed policy option to disable Windows sandbox ACL/DACL mutation

Open 💬 1 comment Opened Jun 22, 2026 by uzair-de

What variant of Codex are you using?

CLI, IDE Extension, and Codex App on Windows.

What feature would you like to see?

Please add a managed configuration option that lets administrators disable automatic Windows sandbox ACL/DACL changes on user-controlled paths.

Requested behavior:

  • Codex may still perform first-time Windows sandbox provisioning:
  • create/update CodexSandboxOffline
  • create/update CodexSandboxOnline
  • create/update CodexSandboxUsers
  • set up Codex-owned helper/runtime/secrets directories needed for the sandbox
  • Codex must not automatically add, remove, or rewrite allow/deny ACEs on:
  • workspaces
  • repositories
  • user profile trees
  • AppData
  • .git
  • additional writable/read roots
  • arbitrary folders on other drives
  • If the sandbox user does not already have the required NTFS rights, Codex should fail closed with a clear diagnostic:
  • path
  • required principal, e.g. CodexSandboxOffline or CodexSandboxUsers
  • required right, e.g. read/execute or modify
  • suggested manual icacls direction, without applying it automatically

Suggested config shape, exact naming flexible:

[windows]
sandbox = "elevated"
sandbox_acl_mode = "manual"

or in managed policy:

[windows]
sandbox_acl_mode = "manual"

Possible values:

automatic  # current behavior/default
manual     # never mutate workspace/user-path ACLs; fail if rights are missing

This should be enforceable from managed_config.toml so enterprise/admin-managed environments can require the safer mode globally.

Additional information

This is important for enterprise and security-controlled Windows environments.

Many IT/security teams do not want development tools silently changing NTFS DACLs because:

  • ACLs are normally owned by endpoint management, GPO, Intune, security baselines, or deployment scripts.
  • Silent inherited ACE changes can expand access across large profile/workspace trees.
  • Unexpected deny ACEs can break Git, SSH, build tools, Electron/Chromium apps, and other software.
  • Stale SIDs and modified ownership/permissions remain after uninstall or account cleanup.
  • Auditors expect permission changes to be explicit, reviewable, and attributable.
  • In regulated environments, failing closed is preferable to silently granting access.

For these environments, the desired model is:

  1. Codex provisions the sandbox identities.
  2. Administrators manually grant the required NTFS rights.
  3. Codex runs only where those rights already exist.
  4. Missing permissions produce a clear error instead of automatic ACL repair/mutation.

Related issues that appear to be in the same problem family:

  • #14006 Windows sandbox may auto-apply NTFS deny ACE on world-writable workspace paths
  • #12343 Security concern: CodexSandboxOffline/Online assigned to entire user profile tree on Windows 11
  • #15777 Codex sandbox installation corrupts ACL on AppData
  • #27236 Codex elevated Windows sandbox ACLs appear to break Electron/Chromium GPU sandbox for apps under AppData\Local
  • #17179 Windows workspace-write sandbox can change project ownership to CodexSandboxOffline and cause persistent write failures
  • #22044 Windows restricted-token sandbox issues around ACL/SID stamping

If maintainers consider this a duplicate of #14006, please treat this as a concrete proposed resolution: a managed, documented "manual ACL mode" for Windows sandboxing.

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