Supply chain security: Publish Sigstore signatures for release artifacts
Resolved 💬 2 comments Opened Sep 18, 2025 by lordmauve Closed Nov 28, 2025
💡 Likely answer: A maintainer (etraut-openai, contributor)
responded on this thread — see the highlighted reply below.
Binary release artifacts for this project are currently unsigned, which leaves a risk to supply chain security.
Publishing Sigstore signatures alongside each artifact is an easy way to provide cryptographic proof of provenance, i.e. the build was performed in GitHub Actions from specific source code.
As far as I know, the GitHub Action for this needs no additional set-up: https://github.com/sigstore/gh-action-sigstore-python
Projects like CPython have adopted this practice; it would be a strong step toward securing the integrity of Codex releases.
2 Comments
I looked into it and also GitHub attestations are an option for artifact signing for build provenance.
For public repos, GitHub attestations are published to sigstore's Rekor and are interchangeable with sigstore signatures. However the attestations are also listed in the project, for example, like here with LLVM:
https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/attestations
The artifacts can easily be verified with
gh attestation verify.Thanks for the feature request. This hasn't received any upvotes in over two months, so I'm going to close.