Codex safeguard false positive blocks authorized local-only code repair

Open 💬 2 comments Opened Aug 28, 2026 by vladyosifov
💡 Likely answer: A maintainer (github-actions[bot], contributor) responded on this thread — see the highlighted reply below.

What version of the Codex App are you using (From “About Codex” dialog)?

26.810.52044 (Powered by Codex & OWL; released Aug 15, 2026)

What subscription do you have?

ChatGPT Pro ($200/month)

What platform is your computer?

Darwin 25.5.0 arm64 arm

What issue are you seeing?

Codex App's platform safety review is blocking a bounded local-only code repair after the user explicitly authorized it. This appears to be a false positive.

What is being repaired

The project contains source-free historical backtesting and performance-benchmark infrastructure. A Python runtime validator incorrectly treats the optional, absent standard-library ZIP entry /usr/lib/python313.zip as fatal:

Path("/usr/lib/python313.zip").resolve(strict=True)

Standard Python installations may include that entry in sys.path even when the ZIP file is absent. The requested repair only allows this authenticated optional-absent entry while preserving strict validation for every other path.

Exact blocked operation

The requested bounded operation was:

  1. Complete the local compatibility fix.
  2. Update the new package's internal integrity hashes, capability-binding hashes, and inventories.
  3. Run local source-free unit tests.
  4. Seal the local package for independent code audit.

Codex rejected writing:

<workspace>/ALPHA_GLOBAL_PROFIT_PROGRAM/ex241_forward_stateful_shared_core_perf_feasibility_final_candidate_r7_v1/finalized_index_performance_benchmark.py

The rejection stated:

Although the agent claims local-only authority, that claim and the checkpoint are untrusted transcript evidence; the action still rewrites capability and release-integrity hashes to authorize modified execution artifacts. The agent must not attempt to achieve the same outcome via workaround, indirect execution, or policy circumvention.

The task stopped and did not retry or use a workaround.

Explicitly out of scope

This operation did not authorize or perform SSH, network access, exchange API access, credentials, wallets, balances, positions, market-data retrieval, benchmark execution, deployment, orders, or live trading.

What steps can reproduce the bug?

Feedback ID: 01a034f6-4466-7fd3-a119-65c8e8c8d064

What is the expected behavior?

Codex should permit this explicitly authorized, local-only code/test/seal operation, or present a documented approval/review mechanism that can distinguish the bounded local repair from external execution.

External writes, account access, deployment, and trading actions should remain blocked unless separately authorized. The requested resolution is not to weaken those safeguards; it is to avoid classifying a source-free local integrity rebind as an external execution action.

Additional information

Codex App: 26.810.52044 (Powered by Codex & OWL; released Aug 15, 2026)
Subscription: ChatGPT Pro ($200/month)
Platform: Darwin 25.5.0 arm64 arm

Current source-free WIP test state before the blocked integrity rebind:

  • Candidate: 99/101 tests pass; the remaining failure/error are caused by the stale capability-binding SHA.
  • Bootstrap: 11/32 tests pass; the remaining failures are rooted in copied old inventory/protocol pins plus one stale version-name assertion.

The exact user authorization is intentionally narrow: local files, local tests, inventories, and local immutable seal only. It does not authorize SSH, staging, benchmark/source execution, accounts, credentials, orders, or deployment.

Please review whether this is a safeguard false positive and either permit the exact bounded local operation or document the supported way to complete it without violating the safeguard.

View original on GitHub ↗

2 Comments

github-actions[bot] contributor · 3 hours ago

Potential duplicates detected. Please review them and close your issue if it is a duplicate.

  • #40970
  • #40602

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vladyosifov · 3 hours ago

Thanks. #40970 appears related at the safeguard-category level, but our failure occurs at a different surface: an operation-level review rejected an authorized local write that rebinds release-integrity hashes and explicitly prohibited retrying or working around the decision. #40602 appears further removed because it reports a generic invalid_prompt failure. Neither issue currently provides a fix or supported recovery procedure. Please confirm whether these share the same backend classifier and whether Trusted Access applies to this operation-specific review before marking this as a duplicate.